Chris Stockley -

Talk to christian

Confid. Agreement for people perf. SC services for

Data Request for Generators/Marketers

Working w/ James Keller EES

1. Please provide all data requests and responses provided to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC.) and other parties conducting similar investigations.

2. Please describe your strategy for bidding generation resources into markets. (i.e. PX, ISO, other markets, trading points etc.)

6 3. For the period May 1, 2000 through August 15, 2000, provide (by day, in Excel spreadsheet format) the percentage of your total generation resources that were bid into the PX, ISO and other markets.

6 4. From May 1, 2000 through August 15, 2000, please provide the following for each generation resource:

Unit name
Unit identifier
Month
Day
Capacity available for service
Capacity out of service
Reason for any capacity out of service (Nox restrictions, deratings etc..)
Total daily output over 24 hours
Peak daily output
If peak output less the capacity available for service, give reason

Delano Got it - Have power mkt license

Puget El Paso Mont Power guys

Greg does not want these in but feels comfortable w/ specific or generators

Sundance Alberta

- Name address - what when checked

5. Identify each market (ISO, PX, bilateral market trading points) where you actively trade. SC to SC d

EES to EES too

6. Explain how your trading strategy has changed in the Western markets.

7. Identify the electricity products (firm power, ancillary service products, etc) your company actively marketed or traded in the Western interconnection during the year 2000.

Don't own any gen. in Calif.

8. Provide cumulative transaction volumes (million of Mwh) of electricity (by calendar quarter) for 1999 and 2000.

→ Call Dennis Benevides - Gibran Whelen - 1999 - Neil Bresnan -

3,000 MW June - Aug 2000
159,000 MW - June - Aug
OOM

- Donna Folton
- Joe Hartsue
- Jim Steffes

Not going to SC - going, straight to gen. - for reliab & time reas.

Call Dennis Benevides

(§ 500.112) → Stell [illegible] FOIA req. d

[illegible] 9562

Mary Ann Leonard / [illegible] Legal

Karen ~~[illegible]~~ Cordova / [illegible] 853 [illegible]

[illegible]

#2 EPMI Bidding Strategies for Generators

EPMI acts as a schedule coordinator for several generators who are located both inside and outside California. EPMI's bidding strategies are generally determined by the desires of the individual generation owners. These owners take into account variable production costs, operational constraints, costs to transport energy to tie points (usually transmission, losses, and tie meter multipliers), and desired profit margin when determining minimum prices to bid into the CalPX or CaISO markets. Also taken into consideration are sales opportunities in non-California bilateral markets (non-California generators) which may result in higher net profits from time to time.

Additionally, some generators have operational flexibility, which allows them to bid some or all of their available output into the CaISO ancillary services markets. Non-California generators may be limited in their ability to participate in ancillary services markets because of transmission scheduling requirements of transmission providers to points of interconnection with the CaISO under the Open Access Tariffs. Many of these generators utilize natural gas and emissions credits – both of which are subject to daily price changes. During the period of interest (June 1 – Aug 15, 2000) natural gas prices at the SoCal border increased from $___ /mm BTU on June 1 to $____ /mm BTU on August 15 – significantly increasing variable costs. Generators also take into account the possibility that certain hours may not be awarded under the CalPX and CaISO bidding procedure. Non-continuous blocks of hours can expose generators to significant financial uncertainty in that they are generally a "price taken" in the bilateral or CaISO supplemental markets for the unawarded CalPX hours. Generators take such uncertainties into account when determining their desired profit margins on any hour.

Tie point congestion adds to the uncertainty for non-California generators and can increase overall transmission costs per unit of delivery power to CaISO interties. CaISO payment timelines are greater than a generators payment timelines for variable costs – creating additional carrying costs associated with CaISO sales. Generators attempt to schedule planned maintenance in hours when market prices are expected to be lower in an attempt to avoid lost opportunities in hours that prices are expected to be higher. Overall, EPMI bids small quantities of generation into the market for single plant generation owners who only benefit when their plant is operating and selling energy at acceptable margins above their variable costs.